Equilibrium with Identical Travelers
Let us try to develop our understanding with a simple game-theoretic model. Cars approach a stranded motorist's location according to a random Poisson process with arrival rate λ. Passing travelers are sympathetic to this motorist's plight, but stopping is costly and they believe that other potential helpers will arrive in the future. Every passing traveler attaches a cost c > 0 to stopping to help, and a psychic cost of vt to the prospect that the stranded motorist must wait for an expected length of time t before being rescued.
In deciding whether to stop, passers-by compare the cost of stopping to the psychic cost of not stopping. They choose to stop if c < vw where w is the expected amount of time that the stranded motorist will have to wait if the passer-by does not stop. If a motorist expects all future passers-by to stop, then the expected waiting time for the stranded motorist will be
Passing travelers would always stop if vw = v/λ > c. Therefore if the road is so little-traveled that λ < v c , then, in Nash equilibrium, every passing motorist would stop, and the expected waiting time for a stranded motorist would be 1/λ.
Where traffic is frequent enough that λ > v/c, there cannot be a Nash equilibrium in which everyone stops, nor can there be an equilibrium in which no one stops. The only symmetric Nash equilibrium is a mixed strategy equilibrium in which each passing traveler stops with some probability p, where 0 < p < 1. The appearance of a driver who will stop and help is then a Poisson process with arrival probability λp. Thus if the currently passing traveler does not stop, the expected waiting time until the stranded motorist is helped is
In a symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, all passing travelers must be indifferent between stopping and not stopping. This occurs if c = vw or equivalently if w = c v .
From Equations 2 and 3, it follows that in equilibrium,
Thus changes in λ lead to inversely proportional changes in p, so that the equilibrium expected waiting time for the arrival of a passing motorist who is willing to help does not change with traffic density. As traffic becomes more dense, the expected number of travelers who pass the stranded motorist before one of them stops to help will increase. Where λ is traffic density and p is the probability that any passer-by will stop, the expected number of motorists to drive past a stranded motorist is (1 − p)/p. 1 From Equation 4 , it follows that the relation between traffic density λ and the expected number of motorists that drive by before help arrives is given by 1 − p p = λ v c − 1
We now have answers to our opening questions.
Proposition 1.
If all travelers have the same cost ratio, c/v, and the arrival rate of traffic is λ, then in symmetric Nash equilibrium:
• Over the range of traffic densities such that λ < c/v, all passing travelers will stop, and the expected waiting time for rescue decreases with increased traffic density.
• Over the range of traffic densities such that λ > c/v:
-the only symmetric equilibrium is one in which the stopping probability is p = (1/λ)(v/c), which is between 0 and 1.
-the probability of stopping declines with traffic density so that the expected waiting time for a stranded motorist is invariant to changes in traffic density.
-the expected number of cars that pass by before help arrives is λ(v/c) − 1.
Equilibrium When Costs and Sympathies Differ
Let us add realism by allowing those who travel on the road to differ in their costs of stopping, and in their sympathy for the plight of strangers. Attention to such differences leads to qualitatively different conclusions and to interesting comparative statics that are not found when passing travelers are identical. In equilibrium, for the model presented here, all consumers choose pure strategies, and the expected waiting time for a stranded motorist decreases as traffic density increases.
1 The probability that help first arrives at time t is λpe −λpt . If help arrives at time t, the expected number of motorists to pass by before help arrives is (1 − p)λt. Therefore the expected number of motorists to drive past before help arrives is
We model the situation as a symmetric game of incomplete information. All passing travelers are aware of the density λ of traffic, and they know their own ratios c/v of the cost of stopping to the value they place on a stranded motorist's time. They do not know the cost ratios of other travelers, but they share a common belief that the cost ratio c/v of each subsequent passer-by is an independent random draw from a continuous distribution, F (·), with density function, f (·).
A strategy for any passing motorist is a mapping from his or her own cost ratio c/v to one of the two actions Stop and Don't stop. Under these assumptions, there will be a symmetric Nash equilibrium in which players observe their own cost ratio and compare it with some threshold ratio (c/v) * . The strategy of every player is to stop if and only if c/v < (c/v) * .
Where w is the expected waiting time for the stranded motorist, a passerby with cost ratio c/v will stop only if if c < wv, or equivalently c/v < w. Therefore if expected waiting time is w, the probability that a randomly selected motorist will stop is
If the probability that any subsequent traveler will stop is p, then the Poisson arrival rate of passers-by who will stop is λp and the expected waiting time for the stranded motorist is w = 1 λp .
In Nash equilibrium, the stopping probability p and the expected waiting time w must satisfy Equations 6 and 7.
In this model, we find that if some passers-by are kinder or less busy than others, you are better off running out of gas on a busy street than on a lonely road. Stated more formally: Proposition 2. In the model described in this section, with a continuous distribution, F , of cost ratios, for any arrival rate λ > 0, there is a unique equilibrium expected waiting time w F (λ) for a stranded motorist, and w F (λ) is a decreasing function of λ.
Proof. Equations 6 and 7 imply that in equilibrium it must be that in equilibrium,
Since wF (w) is a continuous increasing function that ranges from 0 to ∞ as w ranges from 0 to ∞, for any λ, there must be exactly one solution to Equation 8 . Since the left side of Equation 8 is increasing in w and the right side is decreasing in λ, it must be that this solution is decreasing in λ.
A Graphical Exposition Figure 1 shows the effect of traffic density on the equilibrium stopping threshold and expected waiting time for a stranded traveler. The horizontal axis plots the stranded motorist's expected waiting time, while the vertical axis shows the probability that a random passer-by will stop. The upwardsloping curve is a "stopping-response curve", showing the probability p that a random passer-by will stop if the expected waiting time is w. A passer-by with cost ratio c/v will stop if c/v < w. Therefore the stopping-response curve is just the graph of the cumulative density, F (c/v). The curve drawn in this figure is the cdf of a log normal distribution with mean 1/2. 2 The figure shows two downward-sloping "expected waiting-time curves." These curves relate the expected waiting-time w = 1/λp of a stranded motorist on a road with density λ to the probability p that a random passer-by will stop. The higher of these two curves is drawn for a "rural" highway with relatively low traffic density, λ = 2.5. The lower downward-sloping curve is drawn for an "urban" highway with higher traffic density, λ = 15. For each of the two highways, the equilibrium outcome is found at the intersection of the stopping-response curve with the corresponding expected waiting-time 2 The diagram was drawn with Mathematica for a distribution in which the logarithm of c/v has mean µ = log(1/2) − 1/8 and standard deviation σ = 1/2. The resulting log normal distribution has mean 1/2 = e (µ+σ 2 /2) and standard deviation (1/2) √ e 1/4 − 1 = e (µ+σ curve. For this example, the graph shows that a random passer-by on an urban highway is less likely to stop than on a rural highway, but because travelers pass by more often, the expected waiting time for the stranded motorist is shorter on the urban than on the rural highway.
In Figure 2 , we compare the outcomes with cost ratios that vary around a mean of 1/2 to those when all travelers have the same cost ratio, c/v = 1/2. As in Figure 1 , the downward-sloping curves show the expected waiting-time function, w = 1/λp, for the two alternative traffic densities, λ = 2.5 and for λ = 15. The smooth upward-sloping curve is the same as that shown in Figure 1 , while the thick piecewise linear "curve" shows the stoppingresponse correspondence for the case of uniform cost ratios. As this curve shows, if expected waiting time is w < 1/2, no motorists would stop. If w > 1/2, all motorists would stop and if w = 1/2, all motorists are indifferent between stopping and not stopping. and the smooth upward-sloping curve shows the stopping-response curve for the case where cost ratios are lognormally distributed with mean 1/2. Figure 2 shows, when all travelers have identical cost ratios, the downward-sloping curves must intersect the stopping-response curve in its vertical section, with an expected waiting time of w = 1/2. Thus the equilibrium adjustment to a change in λ must take the form of an offsetting change in the mixed-strategy probability p so that w = 1/λp is the same on the quiet rural road as on the busy urban highway.
In Figure 2 , although the mean cost ratio is the same when cost ratios vary as when they are identical, we see that with varying cost ratios, the expected waiting time for a stranded motorist is longer on the rural road and shorter on the urban road than if cost ratios are identical.
Comparative statics results
The elasticity of waiting time with respect to density Proposition 2 tells us that when cost ratios are continuously distributed, the equilibrium expected waiting time for a stranded passenger is shorter when traffic is more dense. Here we quantify the relation between the dispersion of cost ratios and the effect of traffic density on expected waiting time. Where F is the distribution of cost ratios, we define the elasticity of equilibrium waiting time with respect to traffic density as
and the elasticity of the cost distribution function F (·) at the point w as
We have the following result, which is proved in the Appendix.
Proposition 3. The elasticity of expected waiting time for the stranded traveler with respect to traffic density lies between −1 and 0. If the distribution function of cost cost ratios is F , it must be that
Simple mean-preserving spreads and expected waiting time.
Michael Rothschild and Joseph Stiglitz [15] defined the notion of a meanpreserving spread to capture the idea of "taking weight from the center of a probability distribution and shifting it to the tails, while keeping the mean of the distribution constant ." 3 Stiglitz and Peter Diamond [8] describe a special class of such spreads as follows: a distribution function G is said to be a simple mean-preserving spread of a distribution function F if the two distribution functions have the same mean, and if they are related by a single crossing property such that for somex, G(x) = F (x) , while if x <x then G(x) > F (x) and if x >x, then G(x) < F (x). 4 The log-normal distribution that is drawn in Figure 2 is a simple meanpreserving spread of the distribution where all travelers have the same costratio. In this example, travelers on the rural road have a longer expected waiting time with the spread-out distribution than with the concentrated distribution, while travelers on the more heavily-traveled urban road would have a shorter expected waiting time with the more spread-out distribution. This observation generalizes to show that, broadly speaking, greater dispersion of the distribution of cost ratios tends to reduce the expected waiting time of stranded motorists on heavily traveled roads and increase their expected waiting time on less traveled roads.
Proposition 4.
Let the distribution function G be a simple mean-preserving spread of the distribution function F , where a single crossing point atx. Let λ = 1/ (xF (x)). Then on roads where λ <λ, equilibrium waiting time for the stranded motorist is longer with if the distribution of cost ratios is G than if it is F . If λ >λ, then equilibrium waiting time for the stranded motorist is shorter if the distribution is G than if it is F .
Proof. Let w F (λ) and w G (λ) be equilibrium waiting times with the distributions F and G respectively.
Suppose that λ >λ. Then G(λ) < F (λ). Since w F (λ)F (w F (λ)) = 1/λ, it must be that and w F (λ)G (w F (λ)) < 1/λ. Since wG(w) is an increasing function of w and since
Suppose that λ <λ. Then G(λ) > F (λ). Then, since w F (λ)F (w F (λ)) = 1/λ, it must be that and w F (λ)G (w F (λ)) > 1/λ. Since wG(w) is an increasing function of w and since w G (λ)G (w G (λ)) = 1/λ, it must be that w G (λ) < w F (λ).
Equilibrium preserving spreads and elasticities
We have seen that a simple mean-preserving spread of the distribution of cost-ratios implies increased expected waiting time on little-travelled roads and decreased expected waiting time on busy roads. A mean-preserving spread can be thought of a stretch of the density function in both directions away from the mean. Here we consider a spread in the cost-ratio distribution that leaves the equilibrium expected waiting time unchanged but stretches the density function out in both directions away from the equilibrium corresponding to a fixed density λ.
Let us define the distribution function G to be a simple equilibriumpreserving spread of the distribution function F around w F (λ) if w G (λ) = w F (λ) =ŵ and if G(w) < F (w) for w >ŵ and G(w) > F (w) for w <ŵ. 5 Proposition 5. If the cost ratio has a continuous distribution function F and if the distribution function G is a simple equilibrium-preserving spread of F , then the elasticity of waiting time with respect to λ is greater in absolute value for a population with distribution function G that for one with distribution function F .
From Equations 12 and 3, it then follows that it follows that
and since both elasticities are negative, η w (λ, G) is higher in absolute value.
Ethical Guidelines for When to Stop and Help
Perhaps the priest and the Levite who hurried past the injured traveler had good excuses. Maybe they had important things to do and realized that if they did not stop, someone less busy would soon be likely to appear and perform the rescue. When stopping costs differ among travelers, it is not necessarily efficient for travelers to stop every time that they encounter someone in distress.
Efficiency would be better served by a convention that passing travelers should stop if and only if their costs fall below some threshold level. Since stopping costs of passing travelers are not likely to be transparent to others, such a rule could not be enforced by external sanctions. But a great deal of experimental evidence [3] suggests that many people act by self-imposed ethical rules that dictate behaving sympathetically toward others. It is therefore interesting to explore the social effects of alternative ethical rules. In this discussion we examine the nature of an "ethical ideal", that is, a rule that, if followed by everyone, would lead to an efficient outcome in environments like the Road to Jericho game.
To avoid problems of making interpersonal utility comparisons, we make strong symmetry assumptions that imply unanimous agreement in the community about the "best" symmetric ethical rule. All persons are assumed to have the same the cost vt of being stranded for a length of time t. We assume that all have the same travel frequencies, all are equally likely to be stranded, and all are equally likely to encounter a stranded motorist on any road. The costs of stopping to perform a rescue will differ from occasion to occasion, but for all individuals, these costs are assumed to be independent draws from the same distribution function F (c).
In this environment, an efficient ethical rule would require passing motorists to stop and help if and only id their stopping cost is below some threshold, c * . If all individuals abide by this rule, then for any stranded motorist, the Poisson arrival rate of a motorist who will help is λF (c * ) and expected waiting time is 1/λF (c * ). The expected total cost of each incident of a stranded motorist includes the expected waiting cost for the stranded motorist and the expected cost c for the first passer-by who has a cost below the threshold c * . This total is:
Given our symmetry assumptions, all individuals bear the same expected total cost. Therefore the expected costs of all community members would be minimized by a rule that set a stopping threshold of c * , where c * minimizes Expression 14. We will call a rule with this stopping threshold an ideal ethical stopping rule. Differentiating Expression 14 with respect to c * yields the first order necessary condition:
Equation 15 has a straightforward interpretation as a marginal efficiency condition. This equation requires that for a traveler with costs equal to the threshold c * , the difference between c * and the expected cost of the next traveler who would be required to stop is equal to the expected additional cost of waiting for the stranded traveler if the current passer-by does not stop. Proposition 6, which is proved in the Appendix, shows if all community members follow an ideal ethical stopping rule, then as traffic density increases, individual passers-by will be less likely to stop, but the average waiting time for help to arrive will also be smaller.
Proposition 6. In the symmetric community described in this section, if the entire population abides by an ideal ethical stopping rule, then
• on busier roads, the probability that a randomly selected passer-by will stop is lower.
• if the distribution F of costs is log-concave, on busier roads, the expected waiting time for help to arrive for a stranded traveler is lower.
The assumption that cumulative distribution function F is log-concave is not a strong requirement. Essentially all commonly-known distribution functions have log-concave cumulative distribution functions. Log concavity of the density function is sufficient but not necessary for log-concavity of the distribution function [4] . 6 Having found a socially efficient cost threshold for potential helpers, we can ask how this ethical rule might be expressed in common language. An interesting candidate rule is: "Treat the misfortune of others as if it were your own." A passing motorist who practiced this rule would stop whenever his cost of stopping was less than the expected cost of further waiting to the stranded motorist. If travelers all abide this rule and have a stopping cost thresholdc, the probability that a passing motorist will stop is F (c) and the expected waiting cost to a stranded motorist would be v/λF (c). Therefore the cost-thresholdc would be an equilibrium for motorists abiding by the rule "treat the misfortune of others as your own" only if
Comparing Equation 16 with Equation 15 leads us to conclude that:
Proposition 7. In the symmetric society posited in this section, if travelers applied the rule "act as if the misfortune of a stranded traveler is your own," they would stop less frequently than if they applied the the ideal ethical stopping rule.
Proof. Define G(c) = c − v λF (c) . From Equations 15 and 16 it follows that
Since G is an increasing function of c, it follows that c * >c. A higher stopping threshold implies that each passing traveler is more likely to stop.
There is a simple explanation for why Proposition 7 is true. The benefits that one confers on others by stopping to help include not only the benefit to the stranded individual, but also the benefit to another traveler who otherwise would have felt obliged to stop and perform a rescue. If travelers take only the former effect into account, they underestimate total benefits that others gain from their actions.
Are country folk more helpful than city folk?
A large body of field studies in social psychology explore what Nancy Steblay [16] calls the "rather simple hypothesis that 'country people are more helpful than city people."' Stebley examines 65 studies, of which 46 support greater rural helpfulness, 9 support greater urban helpfulness and 10 report no significant differences.
A carefully designed study by Paul Amato [2] performed a series of field experiments in 55 randomly selected Australian communities stratified by size and isolation. 7 In each of these communities, Amato and his co-workers staged a number of situations that tested the willingness of random passersby to help a stranger. One of Amato's staged events bears a close similarity to the Road to Jericho game. Amato described the set-up as follows:
The episode began with the investigator walking along the sidewalk with a noticeable limp. A suitable pedestrian approaching from the opposite direction was selected to be the subject . . . the investigator would suddenly drop to the sidewalk with a cry of pain. Then while half kneeling, the investigator would reveal a heavily bandaged leg, with . . . bandage generously smeared with a fresh application of theatrical blood.
A confederate observed whether the subject offered to help and scored the response of the subject on a scale of "prosocial responsiveness." Amato found that the percentage of individuals who offered to help the injured person declined steadily with population size, from a helping rate of about 50 per cent in communities with populations below 5,000 to about 15 percent in larger cities. In another study [1] , Amato conducted the hurt-leg experiment in several small Northern California cities and also in San Francisco. His findings were similar to those for Australia. In the small Californian cities, 43% of the subjects offered to help and in San Francisco, 20% offered help.
Robert Levine and his co-workers [12] [13] conducted two series of field experiments in a large number of small, medium, and large U.S. cities, once in the early 1990's and again 13-15 years later. These experiments included an episode similar to Amato's hurt-leg experiment.
"Walking with a heavy limp and wearing a large and clearly visible leg brace, experimenters 'accidentally' dropped and then unsuccessfully struggled to reach down for a pile of magazines..."
Both studies found that in places with larger populations, people were less likely to help. Evidence from the first of these studies suggested that population density had a stronger effect than population size. In the second study, there was insufficient independent variation of size and density to allow them to statistically distinguish the effects of size from those of density.
Our theoretical model suggests that when the hurt-leg experiment is performed on more busily traveled sidewalks, the fraction of passers-by who offer to help would be smaller, but that the average amount of time between offers to help would be shorter. As far as I know, none of these studies calculated the effects of a direct measure of the traffic rate on either the probability that an individual would stop, or on the average amount of time that the "victim" would have to wait for help. 8 While it is likely that the cities with larger population had more frequent pedestrian traffic on the sidewalks where the experiments were performed, this correlation is not likely to be perfect. Levine makes a partial correction for this effect by using population density as well as population size as a variable.
Suppose that we want to test the hypothesis that "big city life leads to public apathy and a lack of concern for the well-being of others." Our discussion suggests that it would not be sufficient simply to find whether "country people are more helpful than city people" by finding the relation between population size and probability of helping, nor would it be sufficient to find out whether people are less likely to stop on busier sidewalks. Our model has it that even if people everywhere have the same distribution of sympathies for others, those who travel on busy city sidewalks are less likely to stop as those on less busy small-town sidewalks. But this model also predicts that the average amount of time between offers of help would be smaller, the busier the sidewalk. If experimenters were to discover that the expected amount of time between offers of help is greater on the busy sidewalks of large cities, this evidence would suggest that those in big cities may tend to have less sympathy or higher costs of stopping than those in small towns.
Related Theoretical Work

The Volunteer's Dilemma game
In 1964, a young woman named Kitty Genovese was attacked and stabbed to death on the streets of New York City. According to news accounts, the murder was witnessed by a large number of people whose apartments overlooked the site of the crime. Yet, none of them came to help her or even bothered to call the police. Commentators offered this event as evidence that big city life leads to public apathy and a lack of concern for the wellbeing of others. Andreas Diekmann, a sociologist, suggested that these sad events might better explained as the result of a coordination problem that arises whenever well-meaning observers are aware that several other potential helpers are available and that the help of only one is needed.
Diekmann modeled this situation as a game, which he called the Volunteer's Dilemma Game. In this game, n players choose simultaneously whether or not to take a costly action. If one or more persons act, everyone who acted must pay a cost of c, while all n persons, including those who did not act, receives a benefit b > c. If nobody acts, all receive a payment of zero. Where there are n identical players, Diekmann suggested that the most plausible outcome of the game is the symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium, which will be unique in this case. He showed that, in equilibrium, as the number of player increases, each individual is less likely to take action. More surprisingly, he also found that as the number of players increases, the probability that nobody takes action increases. 9 Thus, it would not be surprising to find that even if urban people are just as concerned about the welfare of their neighbors as rural people, crime victims are less likely to be helped in more densely populated cities.
Jeroen Weesie [17] presented a more thorough study of the Volunteer's Dilemma game, along with a provocative discussion of its applications. He pointed out that, in addition to the symmetric equilibrium found by Diekmann, a Volunteer's Dilemma game with symmetric payoffs and with complete information will have a large number of asymmetric equilibria. Weesie characterized the full set of complete information Nash equilibria of versions of the Volunteer's Dilemma, in which payoffs differ among players.
Waiting to take action
Weesie [17] also studied a related game, which he called the Volunteer's Timing Dilemma. In Diekmann's Volunteer's Dilemma, players move simultaneously and must decide whether to act without being able to observe what others have done. In contrast, players in the Volunteer's Timing Dilemma choose when to act and can wait to see whether others have acted before taking their own actions. In this game, Weesie assumes that everyone would prefer that action be taken earlier rather than later. A strategy in this game is a choice of when to act, conditional on nobody else having acted previously. Assuming that all players have complete information, Weesie finds equilibrium solutions for this game, both for the case of identical payoff functions and for differing payoffs.
In a paper titled "Dragon Slaying and Ballroom Dancing: The Private Supply of a Public Good", Christopher Bliss and Barry Nalebuff [6] study a game with a payoff structure to similar to that of Weesie's Volunteer's Timing Dilemma. They motivate their discussion by scenarios in which the first person to take a costly action provides benefits to several others who might have taken this action. 10 Bliss and Nalebuff model this as a "game of attrition" in which players have incomplete information about others' costs. Players know their own costs of taking action, but each player views the costs of the other players as independent random draws from a distribution that is common knowledge. Players need not act immediately, but delay is costly to all. Players are able to observe whether any one else has acted, before taking action themselves. A strategy for any player is a mapping from the player's type to the time at which this player will take action if no one else has yet acted. Bliss and Nalebuff show that the game has a Nash equilibrium in which each player's strategy is the same function from his own type to the time at which he will take action if no one else has yet acted. In equilibrium, the first to act will be the player with the greatest net benefit from action being taken. Bliss and Nalebuff find that as the number of players increases, the expected net payoff to each possible volunteer increases. However, for small groups, the length of time before someone takes action may either increase or decrease with the number of players.
Marc Bilodeau and Al Slivinski [5] show that if the Dragon Slaying and Ballroom Dancing story of Bliss and Nalebuff is modeled as a stationary game with complete information and an infinite horizon, then it will have an infinite number of subgame perfect equilibria. However, with complete information, if individuals have a finite time horizon, there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium equilibrium and in that equilibrium, the individual with the highest benefit/cost ratio acts immediately.
Comparison to our results
The sequential arrival structure of passing travelers in the "Road to Jericho" story produces a game that differs qualitatively from both the Volunteer's Dilemma and the Volunteer's Timing Dilemma. In each of these games, only one player is needed to take a single costly action that is valued by all players. In the Volunteer's Dilemma game, since actions must be taken simultaneously, there is a significant probability that costly efforts will be duplicated, even though the effort of only one player is needed. In the Volunteer's Timing Dilemma game and in the Ballroom Dancing game, there is no duplicated effort in equilibrium. In these games, all players observe the need for action at the same time, but all have the option of waiting to act at a later time later only if no one else has yet acted. In the Road to Jericho game there is also no possibility of wastefully duplicated effort, since travelers see the stranded motorist only if he has not been helped. In this game, however, travelers do not have the option of waiting, but must either offer immediate help or drive on. This feature leads to somewhat different comparative statics results.
In the Volunteer's Dilemma, the equilibrium expected payoff to potential volunteers is unchanged as the number of volunteers increases, but the recipient is worse off, since help is less likely to arrive. In the Volunteer's Timing Dilemma, as more individuals are added, the expected payoff to potential volunteers increases, but the recipient may or may not have to wait longer to receive assistance. In the Road to Jericho game, as traffic levels increase, travelers who are not stranded are better off, since they are less likely to have to pay the cost of stopping. If stopping costs differ among travelers, stranded motorists can expect shorter waiting times on more heavily travelled roads, while if stopping costs are the same for all travelers, expected waiting times do not change with the density of traffic.
A remark on modeling strategy
In this paper, we have followed the strategy used by Bliss and Nalebuff [6] of assuming that players know their own payoff functions but believe the payoffs of the other players in the game are independent random draws from a continuous distribution that is commonly known. Applied game theorists sometimes try to simplify their task by assuming that players have identical preferences and then focusing on the symmetric Nash equilibrium of the resulting game: much as we did in the first section of this paper. This procedure commonly leads to an equilibrium in which all players use a mixed strategy even though they are indifferent between the equilibrium mixed strategy and any other probability mix of these pure strategies. Harsanyi [10] showed that this embarrassment can be avoided if the payoffs of agents are not identical, but each person's payoffs are slightly perturbed around a common mean. If these perturbations are independent and smooth there will be a Nash equilibrium in which each player chooses a pure strategy. In the limit as the size of the perturbations is made small, the Nash equilibrium proportions of actions taken in the perturbed economy will approach those expected in the mixed strategy equilibrium of the original economy with identical players. In this application, as in many others, it is reasonable to expect that differences in preferences are far from negligible. Many such games lend themselves to tractable modeling if we follow another suggestion of Harsanyi [11] . The model can be cast as a game between randomly selected strangers, who know their own payoff functions, but know only the probability distribution of payoff functions from which the other players are selected. This allows one to use Harsanyi's trick of converting a game of incomplete information into a game of imperfect, but complete, information. If the distribution from which all players are drawn is common knowledge, then the resulting game, prior to the time that players learn their own payoffs, is a symmetric game, which under suitable regularity conditions will have a unique symmetric equilibrium in which all players' have the same equilibrium strategy in the form of a mapping from their own type, as revealed to them, to the action that they will take in the game.
In the case of the Road to Jericho story, it is natural to assume that passers-by know their own costs, but since they don't even know who else will appear on the scene on the scene, there is no reason for any two players to have different expectations about the types of their successors along the road. Thus a symmetric game of incomplete information seems more appropriate to the situation than a game with identical players or a game with players who have complete information about each others' payoffs.
Conclusion: Fables and Games
Ariel Rubenstein maintains that: "Game theory is about a collection of fables. Are fables useful or not? In some sense, you can say that they are useful, because good fables can give you some new insight into the world and allow you to think about a situation differently. But fables are not useful in the sense of giving you advice about what to do tomorrow. . . " [7] This paper tells a simple tale. I will regard it as successful if it meets Rubenstein's criterion for a good fable: giving new insight to a common situation and allowing one to think about it differently. The fable told here offers a fresh look at the familiar Parable of the Good Samaritan. In the version told here, I apply game theory to the riddle of who would help someone in need if everyone believes that others are willing to do so. The discussion offers some insight into the relation between social efficiency and ethical norms for helping strangers. The fable, as told here, offers a theoretical explanation for evidence that people tend to be act more helpfully in less populous places, but it also predicts that help is likely to arrive more quickly in more densely populated places. The discussion also suggests a modification of the design of field experiments that may lead to a sharper test of the hypothesis that urban dwellers are less "neighborly" than their country cousins.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof of Proposition. Equilibrium requires that w F (λ)F (w F (λ)) = 1 λ .
Taking logarithms of both sides of Equation 17 and differentiating with respect to log λ, we find that:
Rearranging terms of Equation 18 results in the expression
Since η F is necessarily non-negative, it follows from Equation 19 that the elasticity of equilibrium expected waiting time with respect to the arrival rate λ is negative and lies in the interval between -1 and 0.
Proof of Proposition 6
Our proof of the second assertion of Proposition 6 uses the following Lemma.
Lemma 1.
Suppose that the distribution function F is log-concave. Then the function δ(x) = x − x f (t)dt F (x) is monotone increasing in x.
A proof of this result is found in Bagnoli and Bergstrom [4] . 
The effect of traffic density on the probability that any single passer-by will stop is therefore 
From Equations 15 and 23 it follows that δ (c * (λ)) = vw(λ).
From Equation 24 it follows that
According to Lemma 1, the assumption that F is log-concave implies that δ (c * (λ)) > 0. According to Expression 21, it must be that c * (λ) < 0. Therefore Equation 25 implies that w (λ) < 0. It follows that the more dense is traffic on the road, the shorter is the equilibrium expected waiting time for a stranded traveler.
